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Abstract
Do reduced costs of factor mobility mitigate ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms? The case of federations 
provides an indication for this. By investigating ‘Resource Curse’ effects in all federations for 
which complete data is available at the regional level, and employing Sachs and Warner’s 
methodology, it is observed that within federations resource abundance is more of a blessing than a 
curse (while between them the curse remains). In addition, it is also shown that federations with 
relatively worse institutional quality experience amplified reversed ‘Resource Curse’ effects within 
them, so that results are not driven by good institutions. A theory is then presented in an attempt to 
explain the difference between the cross-federal (and previous cross-country) results of the 
‘Resource Curse’, and the intra-federal ones presented initially. It is argued that the reduced factor 
mobility costs within federations (compared to the costs of cross-country mobility) trigger an 
‘Alberta Effect’ which mitigates ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, so that ‘Resource Curse’ effects do 
not apply within federations, and are even reversed. Thus, this paper demonstrates and emphasizes 
the significance of the mitigating role of factor mobility; also, it highlights the relative importance 
of ‘Dutch Disease’ theory (compared to the ‘institutions’ perspective) in explaining the ‘Resource 
Curse’ phenomenon. The paper concludes with empirical evidence for the main implications of the 
model, taking the United States and Canada as case studies. 
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21. INTRODUCTION
In an influential study on the relation between natural resources and economic growth, Sachs and 
Warner (1995) introduced the concept of the ‘Resource Curse’,1 as they documented (under a 
comparative cross-country framework, focusing on the post 1970 era) the negative influence of 
resource-abundance on economic growth; specifically, showing that resource-scarce economies 
out-performed resource-abundant ones.2 Thereafter, several studies followed, deepening and 
confirming further the existence of this phenomenon.3
However, the vast majority of these studies focused on cross-country comparisons whereas 
various, more localized, accounts tell a different story. A well-known example is that of the 19th
century California gold rush in the United States, where the discovery of gold caused a large 
population movement to the west which (among the rest) brought significant development for San 
Francisco, and eventually led to the formation of the State of California, and to its admission to the 
union in 1850.4 Other more recent examples are presented in several studies - Aragon and Rud 
(2009) show how A Peruvian goldmine increase welfare at the localized level, Michaels (2007) 
shows how resource abundance levers development in the long run at the county level 
(investigating regions in southern United States), and lastly, Michaels and Caselli (2009) show the 
same for Brazilian municipalities.5
These examples imply that the initial finding made by Sachs and Warner (1995) is not robust 
to more localized levels. This paper starts with a further investigation of this insight by 
considering the case of federations; thus, Sachs and Warner’s initial hypothesis is re-examined 
                                                  
1 It should nevertheless be noted that concerns over specialization on natural resource exports have been raised 
previously by Raol Prebisch and Hans Singer more than half a century ago; however, these were not discussed in 
a similar context to the recent ‘Resource Curse’ literature.
2 The meaning of ‘resource abundance’ should be properly defined, as it may carry some confusion with it. For 
an extensive discussion over the precise terminologies of natural resources see Laroui and Van der Zwaan 
(2002). In this paper the definition used follows that which is usually employed by economists studying the 
‘Dutch Disease’; thus, resource abundance refers to the amount of already exploited natural resources and 
reserves proven to be economically exploitable.  
3 For further discussion see Auty, 2001, Gylfason 2000, 2001, Gylfason et al. 1999, Lane and Tornell 1996, Leite 
and Weidmann 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001.
4 Other historical accounts -such as 19th century gold rushes in Canada, South Africa, and Australia, or otherwise 
Brazil's 17th century gold rush- present similar stories.
5 Specifically, they show that at the municipal level resource abundance had almost no effect on non-resource 
GDP; thus, implying for potential ‘Resource Blessing’ effects.
3using a sample of all federations for which complete data is available at the regional level. By 
following Sachs and Warner’s methodology, it is found that within federations resource 
abundance is more of a blessing than a curse (while between them the curse remains). To alleviate 
any concerns that this finding is driven by good institutions,6 Mehlum et al.’s (2006) methodology 
is followed and the sample is divided to two groups of federations, one having relatively better 
institutional quality and the other relatively worse. It is found that federations in the group with the 
relatively worse institutions maintain the ‘Resource Blessing’ effects, while those in the other 
group do not (so that ‘Resource Blessing’ effects in these federations disappear).
Following that, a theory is presented in an attempt to explain the difference between the cross-
federal (and previous cross-country) results of the ‘Resource Curse’, and the intra-federal (and 
previous localized) ones presented initially. It is argued that the reduced factor mobility costs 
within federations (compared to the costs of cross-country mobility) trigger an ‘Alberta Effect’,7
which mitigates ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, so that ‘Resource Curse’ effects do not apply within 
federations, and are even reversed.8 The mitigating role of factor mobility has received little 
attention in the ‘Dutch Disease’ literature, although (as this paper demonstrates) it potentially 
carries significant policy implications for resource rich economies. Thus, the contribution of this 
paper is two fold. Empirically, it demonstrates both the significance of the mitigating role of factor 
mobility (showing how under reduced mobility costs factor mobility can actually present an 
overshooting effect (which is independent of the level of institutional quality) to de-
industrialization processes) as well as the relative importance of the ‘Dutch Disease’ theory 
                                                  
6 Since availability of data at the regional level, and high institutional quality, may correspond.
7 Initially presented by Helliwell (1981) the ‘Alberta Case’ describes a scenario where resource rents accrue to 
the province which then uses them both to compete aggressively in an inter-provincial tax competition over 
factors of production as well as to redistribute them to the population in the form of improved public facilities. 
Corden (1984) further discussed this in the context of the ‘Dutch Disease’, describing how Alberta successfully 
attracted factors of production due to the above mechanics; he referred to it as the ‘Alberta Effect’. In this paper I 
adopt this definition, and argue that its mechanics are amplified and emphasized in an environment with reduced 
mobility costs (such as federations, or other localized settings). 
8 Note that the suggested theory is not restrictive to federations; these are considered specifically due to the initial 
observation made on them. Nonetheless, as was mentioned earlier, previous studies that considered the spatial 
and local effects of resource abundance presented similar results, implying that the suggested mechanism may be 
applicable to other localized levels that present relatively lower mobility costs (especially compared to those of 
the cross-country cases).  
4(compared to the ‘institutions’ perspective) in explaining the ‘Resource Curse’ phenomenon,9
through the case of federations. Theoretically, the paper suggests a new mechanism (the ‘Alberta 
Effect’) through which the mitigating role of factor mobility may work; to the best of my 
knowledge, this presents a first attempt to model the mitigating role of factor mobility through an 
interregional tax competition over factors of production (emphasizing the connection between the 
mitigating role of factor mobility and the ‘Alberta Effect’).10
  That said, it is important to realize why federations present a valid case study for the 
mitigating role of factor mobility. To establish that, let us firstly understand how states within 
federations differ from sovereign countries, and secondly elaborate on the main explanations for 
the occurrence of the ‘Resource Curse’. Starting with the former, the difference is somewhat 
subtle. Federal states benefit from an autonomous level that is comparable to an independent 
country - they have their own government, as well as their own judicial and fiscal systems; in 
addition, in terms of natural resources, they own all resources found in their territories, under 
constitutional rights. However, unlike independent countries, federal states do not have (among 
other things) an independent monetary system, or an army. Nevertheless, this means that federal 
subjects provide a comparable setting to that of previous cross-country studies when it comes to 
determination of fiscal policy and level of resource ownership. As for the latter, albeit still being a 
puzzle, the ‘Resource Curse’ phenomenon is given two main explanations; the first is the market 
mechanism theory of the ‘Dutch Disease’ (divided to a spending effect, and a resource movement 
effect),11 and the other is the political economy perspective of ‘institutions’.12 I argue, however, 
that any difference in ‘Resource Curse’ outcomes between cross-country and intra-federal cases 
would be largely attributed to the resource movement effect. The intuition for this is simple –
                                                  
9 This is concluded by showing that once ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are mitigated (so that ‘Resource Curse’ 
outcomes are reversed) then worse institutional quality only maintains the ‘Resource Blessing’ effect (as opposed 
to better institutional quality which does not) and, thus, does not change the outcome.
10 Corden (1984), Wahba (1998), and Vermeulen (2010) consider the mitigating role of immigration and labor 
growth on ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, triggered by increased wage levels (caused by the resource boom). For an 
elaborated discussion regarding these, see Section 3.
11 See Corden and Neary (1982). The spending effect describes the inflationary outcome of an income shock 
(which, in turn, causes an appreciation of the local currency), while the resource movement effect describes the 
movement of production factors from various sectors to the resource one. The main idea is that both effects cause 
a contraction of the manufacturing (tradable) sector, which in turn impedes growth. 
12 See Baland and Francois (2000), Mehlum et al. (2006).
5variance in institutional quality and the spending effect remain to be a concern within federations 
as they are across countries, so that we are left with the resource movement effect as the main 
difference;13 more specifically, if it is further assumed that it is less costly to move factors of 
production within federations than moving them across countries,14 the difference in the 
magnitude of the resource movement effect would be driven specifically by the difference in the 
costs of factor mobility (as will be indicated by the model). Therefore, when looking into 
‘Resource Curse’ effects, the case of federations provides a setting that is on the one hand 
comparable to previous cross-country ones (especially in terms of determination of fiscal policy 
and level of resource ownership) yet on the other hand narrows any differences between the two 
mainly to the resource movement effect, or more specifically to the costs of factor mobility. This 
makes federations an applicable case study for the potential mitigating role of factor mobility.
In terms of the suggested theory, the basic two-region capital tax competition model of 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) is adopted and extended to present the underlying mechanism
(focusing on the resource movement effect) which works as follows – the introduction of a natural 
resource sector would bring the usual resource movement effect, as resources would move to it 
while neglecting the growth-enhancing manufacturing sector; however, the newly established 
resource sector would also increase the region’s fiscal capacity so that it could undertake a more 
aggressive tax competition with its neighboring region. If mobility costs are low enough an 
‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered as the region can then attract the necessary factors of production 
(through decreased taxes, increased wage levels, and greater public good provision) to offset the 
resource movement effect, and maintain the size of its manufacturing sector (or even expand it). 
Thus, it is shown that there exists a threshold mobility cost below which an ‘Alberta Effect’ is 
undertaken (so that the resource movement effect is mitigated, and a ‘Resource Blessing’ is 
observed) and above which an ‘Alberta Effect’ is not undertaken (so that the resource movement 
effect applies, and a ‘Resource Curse’ is observed). In case it is assumed that within federations 
                                                  
13 See Section 3 for an elaborated discussion over this argument. 
14 It is reasonable to assume that the movement-costs of production factors would increase with distance (as well 
as with other characteristics, such as language or culture, which are usually homogenous within federations but 
may differentiate substantially between countries), so that on average it would be less costly to move them within 
federations than across countries. For instance, if I am a Canadian who resides in Quebec then, ceteris paribus, it 
would be less costly for me to move to British Columbia than to Germany, although the distance between 
Quebec and each of them would not differentiate by much. At the same time, within Canada specifically, it 
would be less costly for me to move to Ontario than to British Columbia due to the distance from Quebec.
6mobility costs are below that threshold while between countries they are above it, then this model 
explains the difference in outcomes presented initially. In addition, by following Torvik (2002) 
and modeling corruption as redistribution from the government to residents, the model also 
explains the additional initial observation of amplified ‘Resource Blessing’ effects in federations 
with worse institutional quality, as it shows that a higher national corruption-level amplifies the 
‘Alberta Effect’ (thus, further mitigating the resource movement effect in that region) due to 
higher capital tax rates in the resource scarce region, and higher income in the resource rich one.
The paper concludes by empirically testing the main implications of the model, taking the 
United States and Canada as case studies. The results validate the suggested mechanism, as it is 
shown that resource abundance provides a more competitive tax environment, increases per capita 
public good provision, increases per capita and per worker capital formation, and expands the size 
of the manufacturing sector and its labor share – at the provincial/territorial level.
The paper is structured as follows – Section 2 goes through the initial empirical exercise, 
investigating whether 'Resource Curse' occurs in federations. Section 3 discusses the results 
presented in the previous section and explains the motivation for the model. Section 4 presents the 
model, establishes its benchmark setting, and goes through the theoretical analysis. Section 5 
presents the empirical testing of the model and its predictions. Section 6 concludes.
2. IS THERE A 'RESOURCE CURSE' OR 'RESOURCE BLESSING' WITHIN FEDERATIONS?
There are 25 recognized federations worldwide;15 out of which, the minimum required state-level 
data is available for the following – Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, 
Malaysia, Russia, United Arab Emirates, and United States.16 The sample used for each of the 
federations is the maximum available; complete description of the data, sources, and periods
investigated for each federation, is presented in Appendix 1. As a first take I plot in Figure 1 the 
average annual real per-capita growth versus resource abundance (measured at initial period) of 
                                                  
15 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belguim, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Germany, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian 
Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela.
16 The minimum types of data required to test the given hypothesis include state-level data on real GDP per-
capita, and production measures of primary sector.
7federal states17 (left figure), and of sovereign countries (right figure) as presented in Sachs and 
Warner (1997).18 Additional graphs, for each of the federations separately as well as for the 
similar, though non-federal, cases of China, Spain and Europe, are presented in Appendix 2.19  
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FIGURE 1. Resource-abundance and economic growth in federal states and sovereign countries
                                                  
17 Note that Russia is dropped from the sample; results do not change if it is included, but variability increases so 
that it becomes less applicable to present results on a graph. In addition, note that samples of all federal-subjects 
of a common federation start at the same year, except those of Canada and India (as each has a few regions 
starting at later years); for detailed description see Appendix 1.
18 In each graph, ‘G’ represents the average annual real per-capita GDP growth, while ‘R’ represents resource-
abundance. The measure used for resource wealth in the sample of federal subjects is the share of primary sector 
in total GDP; this measurement has been commonly used in other studies of the ‘Resource Curse’ (see Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh 2004, 2007, Zhang et al. 2008) which validated the ‘Resource Curse’ phenomenon, and is adopted 
in this case as it provides both a convincing measure of resource abundance and a substantially larger sample 
(due to data availability limitations) compared to other measures. The measure used in Sachs and Warner’s 
(1997) sample is the share of primary exports in total GDP. 
19 As was mentioned earlier, the case of federations is not restrictive; different regional settings (Confederations 
like Europe or Federations-de-facto like China and Spain) may be of interest to the given hypothesis, which is 
why these additional examples are provided. Nonetheless, these will not be part of the complete federations-
sample, since the focus is on comparing federal states with other federal-states of equivalent status (meaning, 
Alberta (Canada) could arguably be compared to Texas (USA), yet it can not be similarly compared to any 
country in Europe (given the differences between independent countries and federal-states)). Nonetheless, note 
that results do not change qualitatively in case Europe, China, and Spain are included in the general sample.
G = 0.022234 + 0.035561 R
R-squared = 0.0962
G = 0.021297 - 0.0722219 R
R-squared = 0.1656
8This preliminary comparison implies that ‘Resource Curse’ mechanics affect federal-subjects and 
sovereign countries differently, to the extent that an opposite outcome is observed.  
In their seminal work on the ‘Resource Curse’, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001) 
applied a simple cross-section methodology, regressing average annual real per-capita growth on 
the logarithm of initial income and a proxy for resource-abundance (at initial year), to identify the 
phenomenon. Most of the papers to follow adopted a similar method. To be able to test the results 
against Sachs and Warner’s, the same methodology will be used in this section, and applied 
towards the case of federations. In addition, since the model (to be presented in the following 
section) considers an initial symmetric case (at which the resource shock occurs), a federal-
inequality measure is used to capture any inequality differences between federations, and thus 
create a more symmetric environment.20 Therefore, regions for all 10 federations are put on one 
sample,21 and the following model is tested:22
iiiii USAustraliaERYG   13432010 ...)ln(                                          (1)
Thus, three versions of equation (1) are tested. In the first, real per-capita GDP growth is regressed 
on a constant, resource-share proxy, and the federal-dummies, in the second the logarithm of 
initial income is added (as a regressor), and in the third a measure of federal-inequality is further 
added (as a regressor). Results are presented in Table 1.23 It can be seen that the coefficient on the 
                                                  
20 Federations present different equalization-transfer schemes, so that inequality levels within federations may be
different between them. That said, the inequality-measure is computed as follows: real per-capita GDP of the 
initial year of each region in a given federation is divided by the real per-capita GDP of the richest region in that 
federation, for that year.  
21 Otherwise, each federation by itself does not provide sufficient number of observations to conclude for a 
significant (and thus, meaningful) result. 
22 In terms of notation: ‘G’ is annualized average real per-capita GDP growth,22 ‘ 0Y ’ is per-capita real GDP in 
the initial year, ‘R’ is the proxy for resource-abundance in the initial year, ‘E’ is a measure of inequality in the 
federation in the initial year, and ‘Australia’ through ‘US’ are dummy-variables for each of the 10 federations. 
Since the period investigated for each federation is different, initial income is normalized for all federal states; 
see Appendix 1 for normalization method of initial income. 
23 Although this is not the focus of this paper, it can be seen that the coefficient on the logarithm of initial income 
is positive in both (2) and (3) (though non-significant in (2)), implying that the convergence theory (see Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) does not apply in a regional setting. Nonetheless, there are mixed evidence regarding 
this; Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) derived an opposite result for the US (showing that convergence does apply), 
while Zheng et al. (2008) derived a result similar to the one presented here, for China. Premer and Walz (1994) 
9resource-share proxy is positive and significant in all three versions, implying that federal-states 
experience a ‘Resource Blessing’, rather than a curse (and in-contrast to previous cross-country 
results). 
Although there is already ample evidence for cross-country versions of the above regression 
(observing a ‘Resource Curse’), let us nevertheless analyze the cross-federal case to see whether 
the result is reversed between federations. To maximize the sample, all recognized federations are 
considered (besides Iraq, and the Federated States of Micronesia, for which the minimum required 
data was not available), and for each the maximum number of years (considering the availability 
of data) are used.24
TABLE 1. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for all federal-states
Dependent 
variable: iG
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.01383*** 0.0178396 0.0646893**
iR
0.034659**
(0.014432)
0.042543***
(0.0129007)
0.040931**
(0.014974)
iLnY0
0.0237472
(0.0160393)
0.0467015**
(0.0207327)
iE
-0.078801**
(0.0274896)
R 2    0.4404     0.4820     0.5016
N 250 250 250
Note: Standard errors are robust, and clustered by federation. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in 
parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
Real per-capita GDP growth is regressed on the logarithm of initial income (and since federations 
are measured for different periods, the same measure of initial income is used as in the intra-
federal case) and a proxy for resource-share (measured as in the previous case). Results are 
presented in Table 2. It is possible to see that as expected (and as was also observed in other cross-
country studies) this time the coefficient on the resource-share is negative and significant (albeit 
                                                                                                                                                               
show why regional divergent is, in fact, an expected outcome. On the other hand, the coefficient on the inequality 
measure implies for convergence between federations (as is also observed in Table 2), since it shows that the 
more equal (in terms of income distribution between regions) a federation is (which is associated with better 
institutions, and so in turn, with higher initial income) the slower is its real per capita growth rate, on average.
24 For complete description of data, sources, and periods investigated, see Appendix 3.
10
only at the 10% level, due to the relative small sample size).25 Thus, the difference between the 
intra-federal and cross-federal results is observed.
To alleviate any concerns that the above result is driven by good institutions (as it can be 
reasonably suspected that good institutions and availability of data at the regional level 
correspond) let us follow Mehlum et al.’s (2006) methodology,26 and divide the sample to two 
groups; the first (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and United States) presents the group of 
federations with the relatively better institutions, and the second (Brazil, India, Malaysia, Russia, 
and United Arab Emirates) presents the group of federations with the relatively worse.27
TABLE 2. Growth regression, as in equation (1), for all federations
Dependent 
variable: iG
Constant 0.022125***
iR
-0.045258*
(0.0260754)
iLnY0
-0.0072069*
(0.0036346)
R 2    0.1636
N 23
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
The same regressions presented in Table 1 (following equation (1)) are undertaken for each of the 
two groups separately (using the same variables). Results are presented in Table 3. Interestingly,
                                                  
25 Note that as opposed to the intra-federal case convergence is observed in the cross-federal setting as the 
coefficient on the logarithm of initial income is negative and significant (at the 10% level, due to the limited 
sample size).
26 Mehlum et al. (2006) divided the sample of Sachs and Warner (1997) to two groups of countries – one with 
relatively better institutions, and the other with relatively worse. By following Sachs and Warner’s methodology 
(1997) they found that ‘Resource Curse’ effects amplified in the group with the relatively worse institutions, 
while they disappeared in the group with the relatively better ones.
27 The division was based on the average Corruption Perception Index level (published by Transparency 
International) for the years 1995-2010. 
11
the results are quite the opposite than those presented by Mehlum et al. (2006).28 As can be seen 
from the table, in all three versions of the regression the coefficient on the resource-share proxy (r) 
in ‘Group 1’ (composed of the federations with relatively better institutions) is non-significant,
while that in ‘Group 2’ (composed of the federations with relatively worse institutions) remains 
significant as in the regressions made on the entire sample; in addition, R-squared is consistently 
(and significantly) lower in the regressions made on ‘Group 1’ (compared to those observed in the 
regressions made on ‘Group 2’). This implies that under an environment with reduced factor 
mobility costs, worse institutional quality rather maintains the reversed ‘Resource Curse’ 
outcomes (contrary to the observations made in the cross-country studies), whereas better 
institutional quality does not.29
3. DISCUSSION
Tables 1 and 2 emphasize the contrast between the intra-federal and cross-federal cases, as in the 
former a ‘Resource Blessing’ is observed, whereas in the latter it is rather a ‘Resource Curse’ that 
is observed. The question is, therefore, what is the source of this difference? The answer lies in 
our current understanding of the ‘Resource Curse’ and ‘Dutch Disease’ phenomena. Considering 
that the two main explanations for the ‘Resource Curse’ is the ‘institutions’ perspective, and the 
‘Dutch Disease’ theory (which is further divided to a spending effect and a resource movement 
effect), it can be reasonably argued that the source of the above difference is largely attributed to 
the resource movement effect, which affects countries and federal-states in different magnitudes. 
Let us reason this argument in more detail. When it comes to the ‘institutions’ perspective, 
there is some evidence that institutional quality differs (to some notable extent) at the regional 
                                                  
28 Note that the focus is on the coefficient on the resource-share proxy (r); inferences regarding the coefficients 
on the logarithm of initial income )( 0LnY and the inequality-measure (e) remain similar to those that were 
observed for the unified sample.
29 It is important to note that as much as the current sample provides some valid indication on the subject matter 
(due to the variability in institutional quality amongst the federations in the sample), limitations on data 
availability prevents us from testing the hypothesis on the federations that are consistently reported as having the 
relatively highest corruption levels amongst all federations (Nigeria, Venezuela, Sudan, etc.); nevertheless, based 
on the initial observation, the model would provide some intuition for what is expected to be observed in these 
federations. Thus, a further discussion over this result (providing some intuition and explanations for it) is 
presented in the last part of Section 4.
12
level. Naritomi et al. (2007) show that Brazilian municipalities that were historically associated 
with resource-related production are worse governed today. Bobonis (2008) provides similar 
evidence for regions in Puerto-Rico. Additional further evidence on Brazilizian municipalities is
given by Michaels and Caselli (2009), as well as by Monteiro and Ferraz (2009). Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2007) show that resource-abundance and corruption are positively related in U.S states; 
they validate corruption as a transmission channel of the ‘Resource Curse’ within the United 
States;30 similar results, on the United States and Canada, are also given by Olayele (2010). The 
conclusion is, therefore, that in terms of explaining the ‘Resource Curse’, variation in institutional 
quality remains a concern within federations (similar to the concern raised in the cross-country 
studies). When it comes to the ‘Dutch Disease’ theory, despite having homogenous monetary 
systems (so that exchange rates do not vary) the spending effect is not irrelevant within 
federations. Several studies have shown that there are potentially significant –and non-
converging– price differentials at the regional level.31 Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimated the half life 
of the price convergence rate between US states to be nine years (which is substantially slower 
than the rate observed between countries), and Roos (2006) estimated it to be 15 years for German 
cities; Culver and Papell (2006) found much less evidence of PPP with relative prices between 
cities within the same nation (investigating Canada, US, and Europe) than with real exchange rates 
between European countries. This shows that even when exchange rate concerns are eliminated, 
the spending effect may still be relevant (and potentially comparable to cross-country cases) given 
the regional price differentials (which, at the local level, may be regarded as equivalent to 
variations in exchange rates) and their slow convergence rate.32 Thus, we are left with the resource 
movement effect as the main potential difference between intra-federal and cross-federal (or cross-
country) mechanics.
More specifically, in case mobility costs are viewed as transportation costs (Krugman, 1991) 
or transaction costs (Coase, 1937) so that they vary with distance and are thus lower in federations 
than they are across countries, then it can be further argued that the source of difference lies in the 
                                                  
30 The United States makes a good example in this context, since the expectation would be that the variability in 
institutional quality within federations would only increase as institutional quality of federations decreases; this is 
also implied by Hodler (2006) who shows that greater intra-country fractionalization (which can be regarded as a 
consequence of bad institutions) leads to greater intra-country conflicts and weakened property rights. 
31 See McMahon 1991, Walden 1998, and Slesnick 2002.
32 In fact, Raveh and Papyrakis (2010) show that the spending effect is quite substantial within Canada, as 
resource booms increase regional inflation, which in turn decreases regional exports.
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costs of factor mobility which trigger the difference in the magnitude of the resource movement 
effect (such that if they are low enough the resource movement effect is mitigated and even 
reversed).
TABLE 3. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for the divided sample of federal-states
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
Dependent 
variable: iG
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.014436*** 0.013677*** 0.0371422* 0.063206*** 0 .09444*** 0.1656952***
iR
0.0178911
(0.0138512)
0.0202561
(0.017441)
0.0163177
(0.0287307)
0.0411805*
(0.0177149)
0.0562603**
(0.0137952)
0.0543838***
(0.0124682)
iLnY0
-0.0040104
(0.0071971)
0.0091347
(0.013658)
0.0304921
(0.0168651)
0 .05619*
(0.0217701)
iE
-0.0342143
(0.0189574)
-0.0948181**
(0.0318154)
R 2 0.1295 0.1536 0.3260 0.4148 0.4721 0.4888
N 92 92 92 158 158 158
Note: Standard errors are robust, and clustered by federation. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in 
parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
This can be illustrated through the case of Alberta – being extremely resource abundant (owning 
the second largest petroleum reserves in the world), Alberta exploits its resource wealth to 
compete aggressively in the competition over factors of production; indeed, it present one of the 
most competitive business tax environments in North America,33 which significantly contributes 
to it having one of the highest investment per-capita and immigration levels in Canada for the past 
several decades.34 This, in turn, leads to mitigated ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms (since the attracted 
factors prevent the manufacturing and other growth-enhancing sectors from contracting, thus 
mitigating, and even reversing, any de-industrialization processes),35 and ultimately to ‘Resource 
Blessing’ effects.36 Nonetheless, exploiting resource rents to compete for production factors can, 
basically, be done by any sovereign resource rich country (so that it should not necessarily be a 
                                                  
33 For instance, Alberta presents no provincial retail sales, capital, payroll, or machinery and equipment taxes.
34 This successful factor attraction-process forms the basis for the term ‘Alberta Effect’.
35 Indeed, Alberta’s manufacturing sector grew by 50% in the period of 1999-2009 (being above the growth of 
Alberta’s total economy), contrary to common ‘Dutch Disease’ predictions. 
36 Alberta’s real per capita growth rates have been amongst the highest in Canada, for the past 20 years. 
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unique mechanism to intra-federal cases in-general, nor to Alberta specifically), yet due to the 
relatively higher factor mobility costs between countries the factor attraction process does not 
materialize in the same magnitude that it does in Alberta (or in other intra-federal and localized 
settings which present reduced mobility costs),37 so that ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are not 
mitigated, and ‘Resource Curse’ outcomes are observed. 
Therefore, the case of Alberta serves as a main motivator for the model (presented in the 
following section) which, to the best of my knowledge, presents a first attempt at connecting 
between the costs of factor mobility and the ‘Alberta Effect’ to illustrate how the resource 
movement effect (and thus, in turn, ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms) is mitigated and even reversed.
The potential mitigating role of factor mobility has been brought up previously by Corden (1984) 
and Wahba (1998), and also more recently by Vermeulen (2010); however, each of these studies 
focused on the mitigating role of cross country immigration (and labor growth) triggered by the 
increased wage levels presented in resource rich countries. The model in this paper suggests an 
additional mechanism through which the mitigating role of factor mobility may work (inter-
regional capital tax competition, and the ‘Alberta Effect’), and emphasizes the role of reduced 
mobility costs in triggering it. In addition, as opposed to the previous studies, this one considers 
capital-intensive resource booms and capital mobility (as opposed to labor intensity and mobility)
for three reasons. Firstly – looking into the mobility of capital follows the empirics of intra-federal 
mechanics more accurately.38 Secondly – considering resource intensive resources corresponds 
better to previous studies that have noted that point-source resources (which are capital-intensive) 
are more significant in driving ‘Resource Curse’ outcomes (compared to diffuse-source resources, 
which are more labor intensive).39 Thirdly – emphasizing the mobility of capital (and thus the 
competition over capital attraction) corresponds to the initial supposition that the resource is 
                                                  
37 An indication for this is given by the United States Department of Labor reports (in its publication: “Extended 
Mass Layoffs in the First Quarter of 2007”), which mentions that most mass job relocations are from one U.S 
state to another, rather than to an overseas location.  
38 It is observed that within federations capital flows to resource abundant regions, while labor does not (the 
result on capital is presented in the last part of this paper, while the one on labor can be provided by the author 
upon request). Thus, any potential mitigating role of factor mobility should be largely driven by capital.
39 See De Soysa 2000, 2002, Fearon 2005, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Isham et al. 2002, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Ross 2001,2003, and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003. 
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capital intensive.40 Thus, in-general, it can be said that this story concerns capital more than it 
concerns labor (as opposed to what has been emphasized in the previous cases), which is reflected 
through the theory and model to follow. 
4. THE MODEL
Let us consider the benchmark setting of the model, under the framework of the basic capital tax 
competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), in its simplest form.41 There exists an 
economy with two symmetric regions, each having a manufacturing sector. Production in each 
region is undertaken by capital (K) and labor (L), employed through a constant returns to scale 
neoclassical production function that follows the Inada Conditions (F(K,L)); it takes place in the
manufacturing sector, to produce a final good (Y) that is either consumed (X) or converted to a 
pure public good (G). The starting population size of each region is iL (where NLL  21 );42
labor market is inelastic so that each resident is employed and provides one unit of labor. Thus, we 
have: 
iiiii GXLKFY  ),(                                                                                                                (2)
There is a fixed supply of capital in the economy (where *21 KKK  ), that is equally owned by 
its residents (so that each owns: ** / kNK  ). For starters, capital and labor are perfectly (and 
                                                  
40 Since the resource is capital intensive it is the mobility of its main factor of production (capital) that influences 
the final outcome. Had a labor intensive resource was considered, emphasize was rather given to labor mobility 
(implying for the importance of factor-dependence of the resource, and factor mobility, which merits further 
research).
41 Nonetheless, since I focus mainly on the resource movement effect, several concepts are also adopted from 
Matsuyama (1992). However, while he investigated the effects of agricultural productivity by employing a 
dynamic model with a learning-by-doing function in the manufacturing sector, I investigate the resource 
movement effect under spatial considerations and a tax competition feature. In addition, I employ a static model, 
with no learning-by-doing assumptions, as I am interested in the relative size of the manufacturing size. 
42 Note that throughout the paper ‘i’ represents the region, where )2,1(i . Also in terms of notation, subscripts 
represent the region, while superscripts represent the sector; in addition, capital letters represent level variables, 
while small ones represent per capita terms.
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costlessly) mobile across the economy.43 Each region has a government that levies a per-unit, 
source-based, capital tax to finance a pure public good, so that:44
iii KTG                                                                                                                                          (3)
The after-tax rate of return on capital is  ; although determined endogenously (by the free capital 
mobility condition, which will be presented later),  is taken as given by each region. Following 
that, the pre-tax rate of return on capital would be iT . There are many firms (each being a 
price taker) operating in each of the regions, and there is free entry to the market. Capital markets 
are competitive so that profit maximization by each firm yields:45
iik Tkf i  )(                                                                                                                              (4)
Also, the free entry condition yields:46
ikii kfkfw i )(                                                                                                                           (5)
Residents of this economy have identical preferences, represented by a strictly quasi-concave 
utility function, U(X,G), with the following properties: ;0,0,,0,  XGGGXXGX UUUUU 47 in 
addition, they own equal shares of the firms (in their respective regions). Therefore, given that 
residents spend all their income on private consumption, a representative resident’s budget 
constraint would be:
*)()( kkTkfx iiii                                                                                                          (6)
                                                  
43 This will be modified in the stages beyond the benchmark case. 
44 Note that this model presents capital tax competition as the underlying mechanism for attracting factors of 
production. Nonetheless, this mechanism is not restrictive to capital and can be regarded more generally as any 
type of tax competition over factors of production. Even though the analysis is not presented in this paper, a 
similar mechanism can be modeled using income tax (through an income tax competition), and yet present 
identical results. The main reasons capital tax (and so, capital tax competition) is used in this model are outlined 
in Section 3.
45 Profit of a representative firm in either of the regions is: ))()(( iiiiii wkTkfL   Therefore, 
profit would be maximized at: 0/ ii dkd
46 The free entry condition imposes 0 , for all firms in the nation. 
47 In effect, making X and G normal goods with diminishing returns. In addition, it is assumed that marginal 
utilities of X and G go to infinity as each approaches zero, or otherwise go to zero as each approaches infinity 
(similar to the Inada Conditions of the production side).
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Each region competes for the economy’s capital stock, by means of tax competition (so that a 
capital tax competition arises, modeled along Cournot-Nash lines). This is a static, one-period 
model, where the order of events is as follows – each region sets its capital tax level, based on 
which capital is reallocated across the economy; this determines the regional wage and public 
goods levels, based on which labor is allocated across the economy. Indeed, the underlying 
mechanism is very simple; however, this presents, to the best of my knowledge, a first attempt to 
model the mitigating role of factor mobility through an interregional tax competition over factors 
of production.48  
That said, by equation (4) each region derives )( ii Tk so that it can vary ik by its choice of iT . 
Totally differentiating equation (4) with respect to ik and iT , we get:
0
1 
iikki
i
fdT
dk
                                                                                                                                (7)
By equation (3), we get:
i
i
iiii
i
i
dT
dk
LTkL
dT
dG                                                                                                                       (8)
Also, by differentiating equation (6) with respect to iT and substituting equation (7), we get:
i
i
i k
dT
dx                                                                                                                                         (9)
Each region aims to set the tax level that would maximize the welfare of its residents. Keeping this 
objective in mind, each region would, thus, maximize the utility of a representative resident, 
subject to the budget constraints of the region and the resident. Therefore, in its simplest form the 
problem of each of the regions would be expressed as follows:49
                                                  
48 Also, it is important to mention that although I aim at presenting the simplest model possible, all components 
of the model represent the minimum required to be able to explain the underlying mechanism. Specifically, 
introducing taxes and having a utility-affecting pure public good is essential for creating a tax competition 
environment, and emphasizing the fiscal advantage a natural resource might present in a localized setting. 
49 Note that given the assumptions made on the utility function, as well as based on the setting of the problem, 
there would be an interior solution to the given problem, in each of the regions, such that 0,,, iiii xGkT . 
Therefore, corner solutions are not considered in this case.
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ii
T
GxUMax
i
Let us denote 
ii XG
UU by );,( ii Gxm thus, we get:
50
0),( 
i
i
ii
i
i
dT
dG
Gxm
dT
dx
                                                                                                             (10)
Substituting equations (8) and (9) to equation (10) and rearranging, we get:51
1
1
1
),( 


i
i
i
i
iii
dT
dk
k
T
GxmL                                                                                                        (11)
In equilibrium, the following capital mobility condition must hold:52
21 21
TfTf kk                                                                                                                          (12)
Therefore, in equilibrium equations (11) (for each of the regions) and (12) must hold.
Lemma 1. Under the benchmark case, there exists a unique and symmetric Nash Equilibrium 
outcome, in which .,,, 21212121 GGLLTTKK 
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Thus, we see that under the basic setting where the two regions are completely symmetric, 
resources will be allocated equally across the economy, and the manufacturing sectors will be of 
equal size.53
                                                  
50 This was derived by totally differentiating ),( ii GxU with respect to ix and .iG
51 The following result replicates that which was derived by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). It can be given a 
Modified Samuelson Condition (Batina 1990) interpretation, showing how the public good is undersupplied in 
each of the regions due to the non-cooperative behavior. To emphasize this point further a MCPF (Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds) interpretation can be adopted here as well (Browning, 1976), showing how in equilibrium each 
of the regions will face excess costs when raising an additional unit of revenue, caused by the usage of 
distortionary taxes and the tax competition.  
52 Capital will place where its marginal product is higher, until it is equated across regions.
53 To keep the model simple and tractable learning-by-doing functions in the manufacturing sector are not 
assumed (as opposed, for instance, to Matsuyama (1992), or Sachs and Warner (1997)), and so instead of 
comparing growth rates, levels of capital per capita are compared directly (between the two manufacturing 
sectors). Adding learning-by-doing technology to the manufacturing sector would translate the comparison to 
growth rates, yet it would be at a cost of complicating the model while not adding any further insight (since even 
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4.1 The Introduction of a Resource Sector
Let us introduce a resource sector to region 2.54 Initially, I assume this sector is capital intensive, 
so that, as a simplification, it only employs capital55 (in addition to the resource endowment (Q), 
which is modeled as an exogenous and immobile factor of production) to produce the final good.56
Capital in the resource sector is taxed similarly to that in the manufacturing sector (as was 
modeled previously); in addition, a lump-sum tax (z) is imposed on the resource rents.57
Therefore, in this case the regional budget constraint would be:
zKTKTG rrmm  22222                                                                                                           (13)
The technology used in the resource sector differs from that which is adopted by the 
manufacturing sector; nevertheless, production is modeled also by a constant returns to scale 
neoclassical production function that follows the Inada Conditions (H(K,Q)), so that:
),(),( 222222 QKHLKFGXY
rm                                                                                    (14)
The resource is equally owned by residents of region 2 (so that: 2
* / LQq  ) and it provides an 
exogenously-determined rate of return of . Therefore, the budget constraint of a representative 
resident in region 2 would be:
**
2222 /)(
2
qkLzkfkfx m
k
m
m                                                                                   (15)
                                                                                                                                                               
with learning-by-doing technology, it is basically the levels of capital per capita that would be compared between 
the two manufacturing sectors). 
54 More generally, this sector can be regarded as any sector that may significantly enlarge the fiscal capacity of 
the region; indeed, this is not restrictive to resources, but is regarded as such in the current context due to the 
specific observation this model aims to explain. 
55 This goes in line with point-source non-renewable resources like minerals or fuels which are capital intensive, 
and which (as been mentioned in an earlier note) have been identified as more influential in the ‘Dutch Disease’ 
and ‘Resource Curse’ phenomena due to their relatively greater potential of producing high revenues. 
56 In terms of notation, since now region 2 has two sectors (manufacturing and resource), a superscript ‘m’ refers 
to the manufacturing sector, while a superscript ‘r’ refers to the resource one (region 1 remains to have one 
sector, as before, so that this notation does not apply to it).
57 Note that results do not change if otherwise a per-unit, source based (and thus distortionary), tax is imposed 
instead of the lump-sum one. Usage of lump-sum tax simplifies the analysis. This, in fact, follows the reasoning 
of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) who used a lump sum tax as well (with the introduction of local public 
services) in their analysis.
20
Once again, the regions engage in a capital tax competition. Note that region 1 behaves according 
to the analysis presented previously (since nothing changed there basically); therefore, let us see 
how the situation changes in region 2, as its problem is analyzed as follows:58
),( 22
},,{ 22
GxUMax
zTT mr
Substituting equations (15) and (13) to the given problem, we get the following first order 
conditions:
222
LUU GX                                                                                                                                   (16)
0
2
2
2
2
22

rGrX dT
dG
U
dT
dx
U                                                                                                              (17)
0
2
2
2
2
22

mGmX dT
dG
U
dT
dx
U                                                                                                             (18)
Note that 
mmrr dT
dG
dT
dx
dT
dG
dT
dx
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 ,,, are identical in computation to equations (8) and (9), only with 
the corresponding notation. Thus, if we substitute these to the first order conditions and solve, we 
get the following:
022  mr TT                                                                                                                                 (19)
This means that if the lump sum tax on the resource rents is unrestricted or that otherwise the 
discovered resource is substantial enough (in the sense that sufficient taxes can be levied on the 
resource rents so that the efficient level of public good is supplied) then region 2 can, in fact, 
efficiently lower its capital taxes to zero, while as was seen in the previous analysis, the tax rate of 
region 1 remains positive.59 This emphasizes the fiscal advantage the resource gives to the region 
in which it was found.
                                                  
58 As is implied by the expression of the problem, preferences of region 2’s residents stay as before (over private 
consumption and public goods).
59 The cases of a restricted ‘z’ or a relatively small resource discovery are not analyzed, since they would present 
identical mechanisms (to the one presented) only in smaller magnitudes, deeming them uninteresting in terms of 
providing additional theoretical insights. 
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Lemma 2. When factors of production are completely mobile the Nash Equilibrium outcome 
dictates having ,,,, 2,111121212 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm  so that the manufacturing sector 
of region 2 is larger than that of region 1’s (in per capita terms, as well as in absolute size).
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Therefore, we see that in the extreme case of perfectly mobile factors, ‘Dutch Disease’ is 
mitigated in the resource abundant region, to the point where its manufacturing sector actually 
grows. 
Let us now consider the case where labor is completely immobile between regions (yet capital 
is still freely mobile as before). This case illustrates how the extent to which labor is mobile does 
not affect the mitigation outcome.
Lemma 3. When capital is mobile and labor is immobile the Nash Equilibrium outcome dictates 
having ,,,, 2,111121212 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm  so that the manufacturing sector of 
region 2 is larger than that of region 1’s (in per capita terms, as well as in absolute size).
Proof. The proof for Lemma 2 (Appendix 5) remains applicable for this case, with the slight 
modification of having immobile labor, which maintains the regional population sizes equal, so 
that the above outcome is reached. 
Let us now consider the extreme case, where both factors are completely immobile between the 
regions (yet are still perfectly mobile within them). Following the analysis of the benchmark case, 
once the resource is discovered the economy is in a symmetric equilibrium. The analysis that 
follows is identical to that which has been presented previously (in both regions 1 and 2), so that 
in equilibrium 022  mr TT and 01 T ; nonetheless, the main result is reversed.
Lemma 4. When factors are completely immobile between regions (yet are mobile within them) 
the Nash Equilibrium outcome dictates having ,,,, 2,111122121 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm 
so that the manufacturing sector of region 1 is larger than that of region 2 (in both per capita and 
absolute terms).
Proof. Once the resource sector is introduced, it attracts capital only from the manufacturing 
sector of the same region (since factors are immobile across regions), so that the above result is 
reached.
Thus, when factors are immobile across regions the usual ‘Dutch Disease’ result is derived 
(specifically, the resource movement effect) in the sense that the manufacturing sector of the 
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resource abundant region contracts.60 The opposite results of the two extreme cases provide some 
intuition for the mechanics that this model tries to emphasize. When factors are immobile there is 
a resource movement effect towards the resource sector, and the manufacturing sector contracts, 
yet it stays that way because it can not attract the ‘missing’ factors from other regions. When 
factors are mobile, the same happens, only the manufacturing sector can now attract the ‘missing’ 
factors (due to the fiscal advantage that the resource provides) so that it maintains its size, or even
grows. The opposite results of the two extreme cases (in conjunction with the insight that the 
extent to which labor is mobile does not affect the final outcome) show that there exists a 
threshold of capital mobility-level above which the manufacturing sector of the resource abundant 
contracts, while below which it does not (or even expands), by triggering an ‘Alberta Effect’. Let 
us derive that threshold to better understand the difference observed initially between the intra-
federal and cross-federal cases (and to better realize the mitigating role of factor mobility).
4.2 The Threshold Cost of Factor-Mobility
Let us now assume that capital does not flow freely between regions (yet is still completely mobile 
within them).61 Specifically, there is an exogenously-determined per-unit cost (which may be 
regarded as a transport cost along Krugman’s (1991) lines, or transaction costs following 
Coase (1937)) of  for moving capital from one region to the other. This cost is higher the 
farther apart the two regions are (meaning higher distance presents higher ) and is paid by 
firms in the region to which capital is imported to firms of the region from which capital was
exported. Let us denote the total amount of capital in each region )( iK as follows:
62
exim
ii KKKK  *                                                                                                              (20)
                                                  
60 To further emphasize how labor mobility does not affect the outcome in this case, in case labor is completely 
mobile in Lemma 4’s setting, the manufacturing sector of region 2 would only further contract, so that not only 
outcome does not change, but it, in fact, amplifies. 
61 As was mentioned at an earlier point, a cost is put on mobility of capital specifically, due to the result of 
Lemma 3 (showing that putting such a cost on labor mobility does not affect the final outcome), which is largely 
driven by having a capital-dependent resource (further implying for the importance of the relation between 
factor-dependence of the resource, and factor mobility). 
62 Where superscript ‘*’ denotes the initial level of capital in the region, superscript ‘im’ denotes the level of 
capital imported to the region, and superscript ‘ex’ denotes the level of capital exported from the region. 
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Having two regions means one would be a net importer, while the other a net exporter, of 
capital. I define β as the per-unit cost firms in the net importer region pay on all of the capital 
employed in that region, and γ as the per-unit sum firms in the net exporter region receive on 
all of the capital employed in that region; therefore, we have:63
i
im
j K
K                                                                                                                               (21)
i
ex
v K
K                                                                                                                                (22)
This means that the rate of return on capital changes in each of the regions, so that in the net 
importer region it would be:
ik Tf i                                                                                                                         (23)
While in the net exporter region it would be:
ik Tf i                                                                                                                           (24)
Note that since this is a one period model, the resource sector (once introduced) will only be 
attracting capital up to when capital (in that sector) earns its marginal product; furthermore, 
since capital still moves freely within regions it will only attract capital from the 
manufacturing sector of region 2 (since it is cheaper to do so), so that in effect the movement 
of capital occurs only between the two manufacturing sectors. That said, let us assume we are 
at the stage where the resource sector is introduced (so that the economy is in a symmetric 
equilibrium, as was shown initially in the benchmark case). As before, each region solves its 
maximization problem, and we get that 01 T and 022  mr TT . This means that in case no 
capital moves between the regions then the following capital mobility condition holds:
rm kkk
hfTf
221
1                                                                                                                      (25)
Condition (25) implies that rate of return on capital is higher in region 2 (due to the low taxes) as 
was seen in the previous section, so that capital will be imported there. Once that happens, the 
capital mobility condition changes to:
rm kkk
hfTf
221
121                                                                                                      (26)
                                                  
63 Subscript ‘j’ refers to the region to which payments are made. Subscript ‘v’ refers to the region from which 
payments were received. 
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At this point it is possible to derive the threshold cost )( * above which the resource movement 
effect applies (as in Lemma 4), while below which it is mitigated (as in Lemmas 2 and 3), as an
‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered. From condition (26) we see that * is determined by the following 
condition: 112 T  (since at that point rates of return are equated between the two 
manufacturing sectors). Therefore, by substituting equations (21), (22), and (11) to the above 
condition, and solving for * , we get:
0)),(1(
)(
)(
111
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1
11 
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 GxmL
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mim
kk
m
                                                                            (27)
As can be seen * is endogenous to the amount of relocated capital; however, since both the 
elasticity of substitution between private consumption and the public good and the technology 
employed in the manufacturing sectors are not explicitly specified it can not be determined how 
movement of capital between the regions affects the threshold cost. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
make the following inference:64
Lemma 5. If *  then ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms apply (through the resource movement effect) 
so that (on per capita terms) the manufacturing sector of region 2 contracts compared to that of 
region 1 (such that );21
mkk  otherwise, if *  then ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are mitigated 
(by triggering an ‘Alberta Effect’) so that (on per capita terms) the manufacturing sector of region 
2 maintains its size or expands compared to that of region 1 (such that ).21
mkk 
Proof. When *  then regional rates of return dictate that it is not efficient for region 1 to 
export capital to the manufacturing sector of region 2 (established by condition (26)); on the other 
hand, for the same reason region 1 will not import from region 2 (established by condition (25)). 
Thus, once the resource sector is introduced in region 2 it attracts capital from the manufacturing 
sector of the same region, causing for its contraction; this contraction remains in equilibrium since 
no capital is drawn from region 1 (so that ).21
mkk  However – in case *  then rates of return 
on capital will be higher in the manufacturing sector of region 2 due to the low taxes (seen through 
condition (26)), and capital will flow there from region 1 (so that an ‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered) 
and its contraction (caused by the introduction of the resource sector) is mitigated and potentially 
even reversed (such that mkk 21  in equilibrium).
Theoretically, in case it is assumed that the cost of factor mobility within federations (or other 
localized levels) is below the above threshold, while that across countries is above it, then the 
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model provides an explanation to the empirical observation made initially, as it shows how due to 
the lowered cost of factor mobility the resource movement effect is mitigated (or even reversed) at 
the local level so that manufacturing sectors of resource abundant regions are not contracted and 
so, in turn, a ‘Resource Blessing’ is observed. 
4.3 Cross-Federal Corruption Variability
In Section 2 it was observed that federations with relatively worse institutional quality maintain
the ‘Resource Blessing’ effects, while those with relatively better ones do not. Let us turn to the 
model to explain this observation. By focusing specifically on the difference in corruption levels
between federations,65 I follow Torvik (2002) and model corruption as redistribution of fiscal 
budget, so that, in effect, residents get some of the government’s tax revenues (specifically, a 
fraction  of it). The more corrupt is a federation, the greater that redistribution would be (or in 
other words, the greater  would be). Thus, under this formulation, each region would allocate 
only a 1- fraction of total tax revenue to supplying the public good, and residents would be 
better off by having increased income, yet would also be worse off by having decreased public 
good levels. Let us follow the benchmark setting (after the introduction of the resource sector), 
and assume that factors are completely mobile. In that case, we get:
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By following the same analysis presented in the benchmark case, solving the maximization 
problem of region 1 yields:
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64 Since the initial empirical observations were made on per capita basis, the comparisons to follow (between the 
two manufacturing sectors) are also made on per capita terms. 
65 Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, the differences in corruption levels within federations are ignored or 
rather held constant (meaning, as an example – the focus is on differences in corruption levels between Nigeria 
and Canada, rather than between Alberta and Ontario).
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Solving the same problem for region 2 yields (for each of the two sectors) identical expressions as 
(32), only having ‘1’ on the left hand side, so that in equilibrium:
0, 22 rm TT                                                                                                                                  (33)
Thus, given the free mobility of factors Lemma 2 applies (as before). Nevertheless, this analysis 
reveals various additional insights. Equations (28)-(31) show that in equilibrium public goods will 
decrease by the same fraction in each region, while income of residents will increase by a greater 
amount in region 2 (due to the resource); in addition, equations (32)-(33) show that in equilibrium 
tax rates in both regions would have to increase (to maintain the efficient level of public good66) 
yet would still be driven to zero in region 2 (provided a sufficiently profitable resource is 
introduced). Therefore, the overall equilibrium effect is two fold – firstly, more labor would be 
drawn to region 2 (given the higher income in region 2, yet the identical decrease in public good 
provision in both regions), and secondly, more capital would be drawn to region 2 (given the 
higher tax rates in region 1, and the corresponding change in the rate of return on capital).
This result provides an explanation to the previous empirical observation, and accounts for the 
difference in the intra-federal and cross-country differences. The intuition is straight forward –
under a more corrupted environment regional imbalance will increase, and so increased rent-
seeking behavior will attract more factors of production to the resource-abundant region (so that 
rents be maximized), implying that an ‘Alberta Effect’ would only intensify as federal corruption-
level increases (consequently, amplifying the reversed ‘Resource Curse’ effects). It is important to 
note that this result is largely driven by reduced mobility costs (which explains why we observe 
the opposite results of amplified ‘Resource Blessing’ effects in more corrupted federations (as 
presented in Table 3) and amplified ‘Resource Curse’ effects in more corrupted countries 
(Mehlum et al. (2006))). Indeed, if the setting of the model is slightly modified so that costs of 
factor mobility are higher than * and the two regions are regarded as two separate and 
independent countries (having an higher  in the more corrupted country) then Torvik’s (2002) 
results are replicated and amplified ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are observed between the two 
                                                  
66 Note that it is implicitly assumed that governments would still aim at supplying the efficient level of public 
goods despite the higher corruption. This acts as a mere simplifying assumption. A more realistic view on this 
would make public good provision endogenous to corruption levels (so that more corrupted governments would 
not necessarily aim at providing the efficient level of public goods), yet once intra-federal corruption-levels are 
held constant (so that only variability in corruption-levels at the cross-federal level are examined) then this would 
not change the qualitative results derived under the current setting.   
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countries (as under this setting the resource movement effect is amplified rather than mitigated, 
due to the higher costs of factor mobility). Thus, this analysis emphasizes further the relative 
importance of the ‘Dutch Disease’ explanation (compared to that of the ‘institutions’ explanation) 
for the occurrence of the ‘Resource Curse’, since we see that once the resource movement effect is 
mitigated (so that ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are reversed) then worse institutional quality only 
amplifies the ‘Resource Blessing’ effect.67
This result also helps to explain the empirical observation made by Michaels and Caselli
(2009), who investigated the welfare effects of oil endowments on municipalities in Brazil. They 
found that municipalities did not decrease taxes with increases in oil endowments (contrary to the 
initial prediction of the model). Accounting for corruption levels (as per the addition made to the 
model in this section) explains this result, as it shows that having higher corruption levels leads 
regions to set higher tax rates (to maintain an efficient level of public goods, as mentioned earlier). 
Thus, the relatively higher corruption levels in Brazil (discussed by Michaels and Caselli (2009) 
who present a ‘missing money’ mechanism at the municipal level) may account for the 
abovementioned observation over tax rates in oil abundant Brazilian municipalities.    
5. EMPIRICAL TESTING
Four investigations are undertaken to test each of the main implications of the model. Namely, I 
test for the relation between resource abundance and tax rates (Section 5.1), per capita public good 
provision (Section 5.2), and per capita, as well as per worker, capital formation (Section 5.3);
lastly, to test whether 'Dutch Disease' is indeed mitigated growth rates of manufacturing sectors
are compared to those of total GDP, and growth rates of manufacturing labor-share are compared 
to those of total labor-force (Section 5.4). In cases one, two, and four, the United States is used as 
                                                  
67 This last point could perhaps be explained better through a model with endogenous corruption level, which 
would show that more corrupted federations would have higher variability of corruption-level within them 
(meaning, between the regions). This would bear closer resemblance to the cross-country scenario which would 
better emphasize the relative importance of ‘Dutch Disease’ theory in explaining the ‘Resource Curse’ 
(compared to the relative importance of the ‘institutions’ explanation). Nevertheless, even in this model, where 
variability in corruption-levels at the intra-federal level is held constant (and is not endogenous) this inference 
can be made, since the above can be reasonably assumed (i.e. more corrupted federations would present higher 
variability of corruption-levels within them, as regional imbalance increases) as is implied in previous studies 
(See Hodler 2006), and is demonstrated by others (See Desai et al. 2003).
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a case study; due to limitations on data availability (regarding capital formation data at the state 
level), Canada is used as a case study in the third test.68
5.1 Resource Abundance and Tax Rates
Let us test the following model:
iiii ERTax   210                                                                                                      (34)
Where ‘Tax’ is the average of the ‘State Business Tax Climate Index’ for 2006-2011,69 and the 
remaining variables are the same as in previous settings (with the exception of having 2006 as the 
initial year). Equation (34) is tested twice; in the first case the general ‘State Business Tax Climate 
Index’ is used, and in the second the corporate-tax ‘State Business Tax Climate Index’ is 
employed (due to its relevancy to the model, which discusses capital taxes). 
Results are presented in Table 4. The relationship between resource abundance and the tax 
environment is depicted clearly, as the coefficient on the resource share proxy is positive and 
significant in all regressions; thus, as expected resource abundant states present a more 
competitive tax environment compared to the resource scarce states. This validates the basic 
underlying mechanism of model that connects between the resource movement effect and tax 
competition.
5.2 Resource Abundance and Public Good Provision
Let us test the following model:
                                                  
68 Note that both the United States and Canada present relevant case studies, given the relatively large intra-
federal variability in resource abundance that they possess. Also, since earlier discussion suggests that 
federations with relatively worse institutional quality would experience amplified effects through the presented 
mechanism, then validating the model for Canada and the United States (which possess relatively high 
institutional quality) implies that the suggested mechanism should also be validated in other federations. Note 
that the first test employs the U.S specifically as a case study due to the unique state-level tax index that is only 
available for U.S states; in tests two and four the U.S is employed due to the relatively higher available sample 
size (although results do not change if Canada is included or examined by itself).     
69 The ‘State Business Tax Climate Index’ is an index, published annually (since 2006) by the United States Tax 
Foundation, that ranks US states by their “tax-friendliness” to business. The Index is a number from 1 to 10, 
where 1 is least friendly, and 10 is friendliest. The general ranking is based on an average of five ‘Business Tax 
Climate Indices’ for each of five tax groups; namely – unemployment insurance tax, corporate tax, sales tax, 
income tax, and property tax. 
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TABLE 4. Resource abundance and taxes - testing equation (34) for US states
General Tax 
Index
Corporate 
Tax Index
Dependent 
variable: iTax
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 4.937713*** 3.836928*** 4.966694*** 3.679275***
iR
5.591071***
(1.325627)
5.658133***
(1.058146)
6.152002**
(2.489794)
6.113112**
(2.407309)
iE
2.404681***
(0.7349554)
2.852142**
(1.367684)
R 2 0.2213 0.3536 0.1128 0.1880
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
iiii ERg   210                                                                                                          (35)
Where ‘g’ is the average per capita government expenditure for 1977-2008,70 and the remaining 
variables remain the same as in previous settings (adopting 1977 as the initial year).71  
Results are presented in Table 5. The coefficient on the resource share proxy is positive and 
significant in both regressions, implying for the fiscal advantage that resource abundant states 
experience (so that despite presenting more competitive tax environments, as the previous section 
showed, these states are still able to offer higher per capita public goods).72 The level of per capita 
public good is not a direct prediction of the model; however, this test nevertheless contributes to 
the general argument that resource abundance affects fiscal federalism, increases regional 
imbalance, and thus plays a key role in the national competition over factors of production.
5.3 Resource Abundance and Capital Formation
Let us test the capability of resource rich regions to attract factors of production. Given the result 
of Lemma 3, and since the majority of Canada’s resources are largely capital intensive, I test 
specifically for the attraction of physical capital. Therefore, let us consider the following model:
                                                  
70 All data was retrieved from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. All data on government expenditure is 
expressed in millions of US$, 2000 prices.
71 Note that the District of Columbia is not included in the sample, due to limitations in data availability.
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TABLE 5. Resource abundance and public good provision – testing equation (35) for US states
Dependent 
variable: ig (1) (2)
Constant 3623.171*** 2997.397***
iR
9772.285***
(2623.702)
9700.187***
(2622.199)
iE
1392.868
(1335.091)
R 2 0.2242 0.2418
N 50 50
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
iiii ERCap   210                                                                                                     (36)
Where ‘Cap’ is capital-formation and the remaining variables are the same as in previous 
settings.73 Two versions of equation (36) are tested; in the first per capita capital formation is used, 
and in the second per worker capital formation is employed. 
TABLE 6. Resource abundance capital formation - testing equation (36) for Canadian regions
Per Capita 
Terms
Per Worker 
Terms
Dependent 
variable: iCap (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 4282.076** 1549.276 10644.22*** 693.4898
iR
33207.85**
(15605.6)
29608.64*
(15215.9)
55952.58**
(25258.8)
42847.04*
(24007.21)
iE
5230.44
(10100.46)
19045.19
(17038.15)
R 2 0.3482 0.3637 0.3290 0.3974
N 14 14 14 14
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
                                                                                                                                                               
72 Similar results are also documented by Aragon and Rud (2009), Michaels (2007), Michaels and Caselli (2009), 
and Musacchio and Martinez (2010).
73 All data was retrieved from Statistics Canada. For periods investigated, please see Appendix 1. All data on 
capital formation is expressed in millions of CDN$, 2002 prices.
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Results are presented in Table 6. It can be seen that the coefficient on the resource share proxy is 
positive and significant in all regressions,74 which validates Lemmas 2, 3 and 5; also, the results of 
the per-worker based regressions imply that capital indeed presents higher rate of returns in 
resource abundant regions.75 It is important to note that while capital formation provides good 
indication for the amount of physical capital that was formatted, or otherwise imported, by a 
certain region, it does not provide any indication for the source of the capital in case it was indeed 
imported (so that it could have, essentially, been imported to the region from other intra-federal 
sources as much as from other countries); nevertheless, the basic underlying assumption of the 
model (having a positive link between distance and costs of capital mobility) follows in this 
empirical testing as well, so that it is assumed the magnitude of imported capital decreases with 
distance and increases with proximity.
5.4 The Mitigation of ‘Dutch Disease’
‘Dutch Disease’ theory predicts that a resource boom would contract the manufacturing sector. 
Therefore, to test whether ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are mitigated in an environment with 
reduced mobility costs, let us observe whether manufacturing sectors of resource abundant states
in the United States maintain their size (or expand). The following model is tested:
iiii RManMan   2010 )ln(                                                                                        (37)
Where ‘Man’ is the average annual growth rate of either the share of manufacturing in GDP, or 
the share of manufacturing-labor in total labor, )ln( 0
iMan is the initial level of either (to account 
for any convergence phenomena), and iR is the resource share proxy (measured as in the previous 
settings).76
Results are presented in Table 7. It can be seen that the coefficient on the resource share proxy 
is positive and significant in all regressions. This means that during the investigated period 
resource abundant states were not only able to maintain the relative size of their manufacturing 
sector (both in terms of GDP share, and labor share), but also had it expand beyond the expansion 
of total GDP (in the GDP-share scenario) or that of total labor force (in the labor-share scenario). 
                                                  
74 Albeit only at the 10% level when the inequality-measure is added; nonetheless, this is largely a consequence 
of the relatively small sample size.
75 Musacchio and Martinez (2010) present similar results for Brazilian states in the period of 1890-1930.
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These results provide an indication that ‘Dutch Disease’ is indeed mitigated in an environment 
with reduced mobility costs (to the point where reversed ‘Dutch Disease’ and eventually reversed
‘Resource Curse’ effects are observed), and thus validate the main implication of the model.77
TABLE 7. Mitigation of ‘Dutch Disease’ - testing equation (37) for US states
Share out of 
total GDP
Share out of 
total labor
Dependent 
variable: 
iMan
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.01035*** -0.01982*** -0.03241*** -0.03150***
iR
0.126983***
(0.032958)
0.102367***
(0 .0323361)
0.099373***
(0.0278937)
0 .101477**
(0 .0426408)
)ln( 0
iMan
-0.006513*
(0.0037935)
0 .0005561
(0 .0063697)
R 2 0.2737 0.3157 0.3404 0.3410
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper adopts the case of federations to show that reduced mobility costs mitigate ‘Dutch 
Disease’ symptoms, to the extent that they are actually reversed. By investigating ‘Resource 
Curse’ effects in all federations for which complete data is available at the state level, it is found 
that within federations resource abundance is more of a blessing than a curse, while between them 
it is rather the opposite (similar to previous cross-country studies); in addition, it is shown that 
federations with relatively worse institutional quality maintain the ‘Resource Blessing’ effects 
within them, while those with relatively better institutional quality do not, so that initial results are 
not driven by good institutions. It is argued that this difference in intra-federal and cross-federal 
(and previous cross-country) outcomes stems from the difference in the magnitude of the resource 
movement effect which is triggered by the difference in the costs of factor mobility. In case these 
costs are assumed to vary with distance, then it can be reasonably argued that they are lower 
                                                                                                                                                               
76 All data was retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The period investigated is 1977-2008. The 
average annual growth rates were computed as in earlier regressions of Table 1.
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within federations compared to between them (or between countries in-general); once they are low 
enough an ‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered, so that a resource abundant region can attract the 
necessary factors of production to maintain (or even expand) the size of its manufacturing sector. 
By employing and extending the basic capital tax competition model of Zodrow and Misezkowski 
(1986) a first attempt is made at connecting the costs of factor mobility and the ‘Alberta Effect’ to 
account for the mitigating role of factor mobility; in addition, by adding variation in cross-federal 
corruption levels, the model explains why the initial empirical observation is, in fact, independent 
of institutional quality, as it shows that a higher federal corruption-level amplifies the ‘Alberta 
Effect’. In short, results show (both at the empirical and theoretical levels) that reduced mobility 
costs can act as an immune to ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, so that resource abundance can be a 
blessing. Thus, this paper emphasizes significance of the mitigating role of factor mobility, and by 
showing that results are not driven by good institutions, this paper also emphasizes the relative 
importance of ‘Dutch Disease’ theory (compared to the ‘institutions’ perspective) in explaining 
the ‘Resource Curse’ phenomenon. 
These insights may carry certain policy implications for resource rich economies, especially 
for those with multiple neighboring regions that can act as potential factor exporters. Nonetheless, 
due to the limited sample size, it is important to realize that results may be sensitive to the specific 
periods or federations investigated. Future research may test the presented hypothesis for extended 
periods of time and additional federations.     
    
                                                                                                                                                               
77 Note that similar results are also observed by Michaels (2007) for counties in Southern United States, as well 
as by Michaels and Caselli (2009) for Brazilian states.
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Appendix 1 – Data sources and periods observed: Federal-states
Note: the three types of data collected for all federal-states are annual real per capita GDP (used to 
calculate growth), nominal per capita GDP in initial year (used to calculate the converted and 
normalized initial income), and primary share in GDP in initial year (used the calculate the 
resource-share measure). All basic (non-transformed) figures are in millions of local currency.
Australia – The period investigated is 1990-2009, for all 8 regions. All data was retrieved from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium – The period investigated is 1999-2007, for all 3 regions. All data was retrieved from the 
Institute of National Accounts of Belgium.
Brazil – The period investigated is 1995-2007, for all 27 regions. All data was retrieved from the 
Statistical Institute of Brazil.
Canada – The period investigated is 1984-2008 for the 10 provinces, and Yukon. Nunavut and 
Northwest Territories are sampled separately from 1999-2008, whereas from 1984-1999 they are 
considered a single territory (under the name ‘Nunanut and Northwest Territories’). All data was 
retrieved from Statistics Canada.
Germany – The period investigated is 1991-2009, for all 16 Landers. All data was retrieved from 
the Federal Statistics Office of Germany.
India – The period investigated is 1980-2008, for 27 states. Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Uttarakhand, 
and Chandigarh are sampled from 1993-2008; also, Mizoram is sampled for 1999-2008. All data 
was retrieved from the Ministry of Statistics of India.
Malaysia - The period investigated is 2005-2008, for all 15 states. All data was retrieved from the 
Department of Statistics of Malaysia.
Russia – The period investigated is 2004-2008 for 77 federal subjects. Due to limitations of data 
availability the following federal subjects were not included in the sample: Nenets Autonomous 
District, Chechen Republic, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Ugra, and
Yamalo-Nenets District. All data was retrieved from the Federal Statistics Service of Russia. 
United Arab Emirates – The period investigated is 2000-2007, for all 7 states. All data was 
retrieved from the Ministry of Economy of the United Arab Emirates.
United States – The period investigated is 1977-2008, for all 51 states. All data was retrieved from 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Initial income in each federal state was computed as follows – for each region nominal per-capita 
GDP is taken and divided by the corresponding PPP measure that converts it to US$ (1996 
prices);78 thereafter, to normalize the figures (since each correspond to a different year) this 
measure is further divided by the corresponding real per-capita GDP of the US (such that if the 
PPP converted income measure is from 1990, then it is divided by the real per-capita GDP of the 
US in 1990). This converted and normalized measurement is used as initial income (and can be 
compared across federations and across years)
                                                  
78 PPP measures were taken from version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables. 
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Appendix 2 – Graphs for the separate federations as well as for additional similar cases
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Germany, 1991-2009
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Canada, 1984-2008
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Malaysia, 2005-2008
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Russia, 2004-2008
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G = .0182085 + .0148108 R
R-squared = 0.1289
G = .0147159 + .0486238 R
R-squared = 0.1836
G = .009888 + .1999782 R
R-squared = 0.4291
G = .0181087 + .0317517 R
R-squared = 0.1687
G = .0649196 + .0285786 R
R-squared = 0.0511
G = -.0586538 + .0699227 R
R-squared = 0.01
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India, 1980-2008
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United States, 1977-2008
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Belgium, 1999-2007
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United Arab Emirates, 2000-2007
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Europe, 1995-2008
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China, 1994-2008
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R-squared = 0.0198
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Spain, 1995-2007
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As can be seen, a few of the federations (Australia, Brazil, Germany, Canada, Belgium, UAE) 
present positive relationship between resource abundance and growth, while the rest present no 
observed relationship; however – interestingly (and perhaps more importantly), none of them 
show any indication for an occurrence of a resource curse. 79
Graphs for China, Spain, and Europe, depict a similar picture to the one observed in federations. 
Europe shows some indication for a resource blessing, while Spain and China show no relation 
between resource abundance and growth (this follows the results on Zhang et al (2008) who 
looked into ‘Resource Curse’ effects in China); meaning, no resource curse is observed in none of 
the cases, implying that the suggested mechanism may be relevant for other regional regimes 
(besides federations) that may still present lower costs for factor mobility (compared to cross-
country scenarios).
Data sources and periods observed: Non-federal subjects
(Note: all basic (non-transformed) figures are in millions of local currency).
Spain – Data (annual real per-capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) on all 19 
Spanish regions covers the period of 1995-2007. All data was retrieved from the National 
Statistics Institute of Spain.
Europe – Data (annual real per-capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) on all 15 
European-Union members (as of 1995) covers the period of 1995-2008. Note that the result does 
not change if members that were added to the Union at a later are included. All data was retrieved 
from Euro-stat (Central Statistics Institute of the European-Union).
                                                  
79 Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) show that the ‘Resource Curse’ applies within the United States, employing a 
methodology that is similar to the one used in this paper.; conversely, the result derived here shows there exists a 
weak, non-significant, relation between resource abundance and growth within the United States. The different 
outcomes can be a consequence of the different periods investigated; Papyrakis and Gerlagh look into the period 
of 1986-2000, while here the period of 1977-2008 is analyzed (in addition, they drop the District of Columbia 
and Delaware from their sample, whereas both are included in this current case; nonetheless, results do not 
change if the two are dropped from this sample). This implies that results may be sensitive to the period 
investigated. 
G = .0299281 + .0154119 R
R-squared = 0.0132
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China – Data (annual real per-capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) on all 26 
Chinese provinces covers the period of 1994-2008 (note that the sample starts in 1994 due to the 
price liberalization scheme in the resource sector that went into action in 1994 (see Zhang et al. 
(2008)); prior to 1994 prices in the resource sector were heavily regulated by the federal regime, 
which decreases the relevance of investigating that period, given the context of the hypothesis). 
All data was retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Appendix 3 – Data sources and periods observed: Federations
The sample used for the regressions presented in Table 2 includes 23 federations; namely –
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belguim, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela (basically all recognized 
federations except Iraq, and the Federated States of Micronesia).
Data was retrieved on annual real per-capita GDP and the share of primary sector in GDP (in the initial 
year). All data on real pert-capita GDP was retrieved from World Bank Databases; data on share of 
primary sector in GDP was retrieved from each federation’s individual central statistical bureau. 
The time period investigated for each federations, is as follows:
Argentina: 1980-2008 , Australia: 1985-2008 , Austria: 1976-2008 , Belgium: 1995-2008 , Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: 1999-2008 , Brazil: 1995-2007 , Canada: 1961-2008 , Comoros: 1980-2008 , Ethiopia: 
1981-2008 , Germany: 1991-2008 , India: 1980-2008 , Malaysia: 1970-2008 , Mexico: 1993-2008 , 
Nepal: 1964-2008 , Nigeria: 1981-2008 , Pakistan: 1999-2008 , Russia: 2002-2008 , St. Kitts and 
Nevis: 1977-2008 , Sudan: 1960-2008 , Switzerland: 1990-2008 , United Arab Emirates: 1996-2008 , 
United States: 1950-2008 , Venezuela: 1995-2008.
Appendix 4 – Proof of Lemma 1
The symmetric outcome, where the regions choose an equal tax rate (and so other indicators are 
equal as well) follows equations (11) and (12), and so it is a viable option. Interestingly, it is also a 
unique option –
 In a first scenario, let us assume that 21 TT  and 12 GG  . By (12) we get that 12 kk  , 
which means that 12 xx  ; since the level of public good in region 2 is at least as high as 
that in region 1, then labor will move to region 2 down to at least where 21 kk  ; once that 
occurs (12) does not hold. Thus, rate of return of capital and the regional wage rates can 
not be equal at the same time, so that equilibrium does not arise. What will happen, in fact, 
is that capital and labor will continue to move to region 2 so that in the limit region 1 
vanishes.80  
 In a second scenario, let us assume that 21 TT  yet also 21 GG  . The higher tax rate in 
region 1 means that there would be more capital in region 2, making its tax base larger 
than that of region 1. Taking the first scenario into account, region 2 knows that once its 
public good level is at least as high as that of region 1 it will make region 1 vanish in the 
limit; thus, given its higher tax base region 2 would be able to raise its tax to a point where 
                                                  
80 Nonetheless, note that the concept of the limit in this context represents the long term, and is only mentioned 
here under purely theoretical terms. 
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it is still below that of region 1 yet it equalizes the levels of public goods between the 
regions (causing that which was described in the previous scenario, where region 1 
vanishes in the limit).
The two above scenarios work both ways (meaning, not only when region 1 presents higher taxes, 
but also vice versa), which means that no region 1 can allow itself to present lower taxes than its 
neighbor or otherwise it will vanish in the limit. Thus, the only viable option is when tax rates are 
equal and a completely symmetric outcome arises.                                                                             
Appendix 5 – Proof of Lemma 2
The updated free capital mobility condition would be:
1122
Tfhf kkk rm    
This by itself means that in equilibrium capital per capita as well as capital in absolute level will 
be higher in the manufacturing sector of region 2. When it comes to labor, in case 11KTz  then 
labor will move to region 2 so that 12 LL  (since both wage levels and public good levels would 
be higher in region 2); otherwise, due to the same reasons outlined in the proof of Appendix 4, by 
having a larger tax base than that of region 1, region 2 would be able to at least equalize its public 
good provision level to that of region 1, so that even in that case labor will be drawn to region 2 
and we would get 12 LL  . Thus, once taxes decrease to zero in region 2 we get the suggested 
equilibrium outcome, where the manufacturing sector is larger in region 2.
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